LABOR LAW: AGENCY SHOP HELD ILLEGAL FORM OF
UNION SECURITY UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

IN the absence of state right to work laws,1 the Taft-Hartley Act
permits employers and labor organizations to enter into collective
bargaining agreements requiring union membership as a condition
of employment. In states electing to prohibit the union shop,2 labor
organizations have sought other means of spreading the cost of representation. The agency shop,3 conditioning employment upon dues
payments rather than union membership, has thus become an important form of union security in those right to work states which
have not prohibited this device along with the union shop.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, in General Motors
Corp. v. NLRB, 5 has denied unions this means of avoiding right to
work statutes by holding the agency shop illegal under federal law,
regardless of existing state law.
Subsequent to a determination by the Indiana Appellate Court
States have enacted right to work statutes pursuant to Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958),
which provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial Law."

See note 16 infra, for a discussion of the term "membership" as used in this section.
2
At present, twenty states have right to work laws. For a list of these statutory
provisions see LAB. REL. REP. (Expeditor) 665-67 (1962).
. 3The agency shop is a form of union security requiring employees choosing not
to join the union to pay fixed sums, usually the equivalent of periodic dues and fees.
These sums, in theory, are to cover the costs incurred by the union when acting as
bargaining agent for all the employees in the bargaining unit.
This arrangement, also known as the "Rand Formula" gained widespread attention
through a 1946 arbitration decision of Justice Rand of the Ontario Supreme Court.
In that decision, Justice Rand denied the union's request for a union shop, but
permitted the checkoff of an amount equivalent to the union dues from the wages of
all employees, regardless of union membership. Ford Motor Company of Canada,
1 Lab. Arb. 439 (1946).
The agency shop is currently written into six percent of collective bargaining
agreements. 46 L.R.R.M. 18 (1960).
'Twelve of the twenty right to work statutes have specific provisions against
compulsory payment of dues and fees to a labor organization. The remaining eight
statutes prohibit employers from requiring "membership" in a labor organization as a
condition of employment. See LAB. REL. REP. (Expeditor) 665-67 (1962). See note
25 infra, for the interpretations courts have given these provisions in determining
the legality of agency shop agreements under state right to work laws.
-303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. Warn 8169 (U.S. Sept. 4,

1962) (No. 404).
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that the agency shop is valid under Indiana's right to work statute,6
the United Auto Workers requested General Motors to bargain on
an agency shop agreement to cover its employees in that State.
When the company refused, contending that such an agreement
would violate the Taft-Hartley Act, the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. The
Board found no unlawful refusal to bargain, holding the agency
shop illegal under Taft-Hartley.7 Upon reconsideration and after
certain changes in its membership, the Board reversed the previous
decision and declared the agency shop to be a legal form of union
security and thus a mandatory bargaining subject.8 On the Company's petition for review, and the Board's cross-petition for enforcement, the Sixth Circuit set aside the Board's reconsidered order,
holding the agency shop to be violative of the actY
6

Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959). The

court was dealing with a statute providing that "membership or nonmembership in

a labor organization" should not be made a condition of employment. Reasoning
that many other states had right to work legislation when the Indiana law was
passed, and that several of these expressly prohibited forced payment of dues and fees
to a union, the court found that the legislature intended to legalize the agency shop
by not expressly prohibiting such payments. The holding was an affirmation of the
trial court's finding. For a criticism of the lower court's reasoning, see Rose, The
Agency Shop v. The Right-to-Work Law, 9 LAB. L.J. 579 (1958).
7General Motors Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961). Each member of the majority
entered a separate opinion and applied different reasoning. Member Kimball
reasoned that the agency shop is illegal under federal law because non-union employees are not permitted an "economic voice" in the union's bargaining policies.
Member Jenkins advanced the theory that compulsory payments by nonmembers are
unlawful except where offered as an option to union membership. Chairman Leedom
found agency shops illegal in the right to work states regardless of the interpretation
state courts give to their statutes on the ground that these are states which have
chosen to exercise the 14(b) privilege of forbidding the conditioning of employment
upon "membership" in a labor organization.
With the exception of this decision the NLRB had consistently held the agency
shop to be legal under federal law. American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952);
Public Service Co. of Colo., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950); National Elec. Prods. Corp., 3
N.L.R.B. 475 (1937).
8 General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659, reversing 180
N.L.R.B. 480 (1961). Subsequent to the Board's first decision President Kennedy
appointed two new members to replace those whose terms had expired, and the
Union and the General Counsel filed motions for reconsideration. The Board
granted the motions and by a four to one vote vacated the previous decision and
held the agency shop to be legal under federal law. The Board reasoned that the
union shop proviso to § 8 (a) (3) merely sets the maximum limits of enforceable union
security, permitting lesser forms such as the agency shop.
* The General Motors case presents a dilemma for the parties to agency shop
agreements. An employer and union enforcing such an agreement may be exposed
to unfair labor practice charges if other courts adhere to the view of the Sixth Circuit.
On the other hand, the employer refusing to bargain for an agency shop or to enforce
such an agreement may be subject to a refusal to bargain charge or a breach of con-
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Determination of the legality of the agency shop under federal
law hinges on the interpretation given to seGtion. 8 (a) (3)10 and particularly the term "membership." Section.8 (a) (3), which generally
forbids the employer to condition employment upon union affiliation, -contains a proviso permitting bargaining agreements which
require union membership after thirty days of employment."
There are two approaches commonly taken toward defining the
term "membership." One, the view of the UAW' 2 and the Board, 3
is that membership merely sets the maximum requirement which
may be placed upon the worker, encompassing within its scope
lesser requirements such as the payment of dues in an agency shop.
The other approach 4 is that membership as used in this section
establishes the exclusive form of union security, the union shop, and
proscribes all other forms.
The court chose the strict interpretation of this proviso and
found that the disputed section- authorizes "only agreements requiring membership in a labor organization." 5 Since the agency
shop does not require actual membership, said the court, it is not pro-

tected by the act."' No authority was cited in support of this positract action if other courts agree with the Board and find this a permissible form of
union security. The decision thus injects doubt into the numerous contracts containing agency shop agreements and the status of the agency shop in future contract
negotiations.
mo61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (8) (1958), provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in Any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act ... shall predude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require
as a condition of employment membership therein .... "
zAccording to §8(a) (8), membership must be acquired after thirty days of employment, or thirty days after the collective bargaining agreement becomes effective,
whichever is later.
2 Brief of UAW as Amicus Curiae, p. 4.
23 Brief for Appellee, pp. 12-13.
1 The brief of General Motors was unavailable for consideration. However, the
Company's position could be ascertained from the other briefs submitted.
"5General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. granted,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3169 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1962) (No. 404).
I*Pursuant to the prerogative granted by §14(b) some states have specifically
outlawed the agency shop, and others have done so inferentially. Although the
question has not been litigated in federal courts, it appears that states have power
to prohibit such agreements. Inasmuch as prior to the enactment of §14(b)
several states had statutes forbidding compulsory payments to unions and Congress
had knowledge of these statutes, Congress must have intended §14(b) to grant
states authority to outlaw the agency shops.
If states have this power, then the word "membership" in § 14(b) must be Interpreted to include not only literal membership, but also the compulsory payment of
dues and fees. This being so, it appears inconsistent to interpret "membership" in
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tion, except the language of section 8 (a) (3) itself.17 To correctly
analyze the rationale of the court and that put forward by the UAW
and the NLRB, it is necessary to review the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act as well as the relevant case law.
The legislative history of the act indicates a congressional awareness of the need to preserve some form of compulsory unionism as
a means of distributing the cost of collective bargaining among all
the employees in the bargaining unit. 8 Congress, by means of the
8 (a) (3) proviso, placed the rights of the majority in a bargaining
unit above those of the individual by denying the individual the

right to refrain from supporting the union.'9
The case of Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB,20 deferring to

this congressional purpose, prohibited a union, pursuant to a union
shop agreement, from seeking the discharge of an employee who,
while refusing actual membership, tendered dues and fees. This
decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB,2 in which the Court equated union
§ (8) (a) (3) as referring only to the literal joining of a union, as did the court in the
instant case.
For a discussion of this problem see generally, Johannesen, Recent Decisions Concerning the Agency Shop, 40 N.C.L. REv. 603, 612-13 (1962); 62 CoLuMr. L. REV. 538
(1962).
17Brief for Appellee, pp. 22-32, cited extensive legislative history in support of the
Board's position. The court declined this aid to interpretation on the ground that
it was not for the court "to enlarge the clear language of the statute." 303 F.2d at 430.
Is As Senator Taft asserted in discussing the proviso to § 8 (a) (3), "In other words,
what we do, in effect, is to say that no one can get a free ride in such a shop. That
meets one of the arguments for the union shop. The employee has to pay union
dues." 93 Cong. Rec 3837 (1947).
That Congress had in mind agency shop arrangements when dratfing §§ 8 (a) (3) and
7 is demonstrated by its awareness of, and reliance on, the arbitration decision of
Judge Rand. Senator Taft explained the union security provisions of the act by stating,
"[Tjhe rule adopted by the committee is substantially the rule now in effect in
Canada.... [TMhe present rule in Canada is that... an employee ... must...
pay dues, even though he does not join the union. If he pays dues without joining
the union, he has the right to be employed." 93 Cong. Rec. 4887 (1947).
29 Proponents of union security agreements traditionally argue that such agreements
provide harmony and internal discipline, as well as preventing employees from benefitting from contracts without cost to themselves. See generally GOLDEN 9- Run.NBuRo, TnE DYNAMICS OF

INDUSTRIAL

DEMiocAcy 190-230 (1940); Pollitt, Right to Work

Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. Rlv.233 (1959). On the other hand,
right to work proponents emphasize the limitations imposed upon employees' freedom
of association by union security agreements which make an employee support a union
against his desires. See generally Swindler, The Right to Work, A Decade of Development, 36 NFm. L. Rav. 276 (1957); 36 GEo. L.J. 198 (1948).
-1 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). Here several employees
were willing to pay the equivalent of dues and initiation fees, but because of religious
objections would not submit to an oath, a prerequisite of membership.
21347 U.S. 17, 42 (1954).
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membership with the payment of dues alone, and interpreted the
congressional intent behind section 8 (a) (3) as being "to prevent
utilization of union security agreements [except] to compel payment
of union dues and fees" 22 and therefore to eliminate free riders by
making them contribute to the union's support.23
Thus, the requirement of "membership" as contained in the
proviso to section 8 (a) (3) does not mean the literal joining of a
union.2 4 Inasmuch as an employee, whether under the agency or
union shop, has the same restrictions imposed upon him, namely
the payment of dues and fees, the agency shop is nothing more than
a clear expression of the maximum -form of enforceable union

security.25
22 Id.

at 41.
"Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions' concern about 'free riders,'...
and gave the unions the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding
from unions the power to'cause the discharge of employees for any other reason."
Ibid.
"Although supporting case law is limited to the Union Starch and Radio Officers'
decisions, it is generally accepted by the commentators that an employee does not have
to become an actual member under a union shop agreement, so long as he tenders
the equivalent of dues and fees. See Graves, The Agency Shop vs. The "Right to
Work," 40 TExAs L. Rlv. 542, 544 (1962); Rose, The Agency Shop v. The Right to
Work Law, 9 LAn. L.J. 579, 579-80 (1958); Toner, The Taft-Hartley Union Shop Does
Not Force Anyone to join a Union, 6 LAB. L.J. 690 (1955); 2 CCH LAB. L. Rp. 4525,
at 9550 (1962); P-H LAB. REx.. j 21,462.3, 22,152.2 (1962).
Section 8(a) (3) prohibits an employer to discriminate against an employee for
nonmembership if such membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than
delinquency in the payment of dues. Section 8 (b) (2), the reciprocal of § 8(a) (8)
proVides that a union cannot cause an employer to discharge an employee for reasons
other than the non-payment of dues and fees. For cases disallowing discharge for
other reasons see, e.g., NLRB v. Local 815, Teamsters Union, 290 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1961) (participation in dual union activities); NLRB v. Local 450, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 281 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961)
(refusal to participate in union activities); NLRB v. National Automotive Fibres, Inc,
277 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1960) (non-payment of fines and assessments). See also, Note,
45 Gao. L.J. 250 (1957). These sources indicate that "membership" as used in § 8 (a) (3)
does not refer to literal membership, but the payment of fees to the union.
2r Several state courts have recognized this synonymity as evidenced by the decisions
considering the legality of the agency shop under right to work statutes drafted only
in terms of "membership." All state courts considering the question, with the
exception of Indiana, have outlawed the agency shop. The Kansas Supreme Court
reached this result by finding that the agency shop constitutes an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. The court sup.
ported its position by observing that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have held that the payment of dues and fees is the only enforceable condition of
employment under union shop agreements. Such payment being identical with membership, it is therefore illegal in Kansas. Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11,
360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 268 U.S. 829 (1961).
In Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Lines,
Inc., 202 F. Supp. 726 (D. Nev. 1962), a federal district court interpreted Nevada's right
to work law as proscribing agency shop agreements. An Arizona trial court reached
the same conclusion under that state's right to work statute. Arizona Flame
23
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It is submitted that the arguments as to the legality of the agency
shop expressed thus far in the dispute, in terms of whether. the
proviso to section 8 (a) (3) establishes the exclusive permissible form
of union security or the maximum limits, fail to recognize that under
no form of permissible jinion security is an er Lployee required to
assume literal membership in a labor organization. The union
shop being a -protected form of union security under the act, the
legality of the agency shop, an identical. form of security, should
logically follow. 2 6
Moreover, even if courts should find that the agency and union
shops are not legally identical, the agency shop should nevertheless
be valid under federal law in accordance with the reasoning put
- 7 The Board argued that the union shop is
forward by the NLRB.
the more coercive form of security in that it demands membership,
while the agency shop allows the employee to pay dues without
assuming membership. In its desire to afford the employee maximum freedom while concurrently granting the union the right to
demand security, Congress, according to the Board, could not have
intended to protect the stronger form of union security and at the
same time forbid a less demanding form of security?8s
Restaurant, Inc. v. Baldwin, 26 COI LAB. CAs. 68,647 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1954), aff'd
on other grounds, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957). The Florida Supreme Court,
in Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), petition for
review granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3169 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1962) (No. 368) held that the
agency shop abridged the privilege granted to workers by the state constitution
to refrain from joining unions. The constitution provides, that employment shall not
be conditioned on "membership or nonmembership in any labor union . . ." FLA.
CONsr., DzCLARAT!ON or Itxcrrs § 12. The court found that the agency shop is repugnant
to the constitution in that it requires non-union employees to pay fees to the union
in order to exercise their constitutional privilege of refusing membership.
For a discussion of state attorney general rulings and the status of the agency shop
in each right to work state, see 3 CCH STATE LAB. L. REP. 49,507 (1962).
- 'When membership is not discriminatorily denied, all employees under an agency
shop have the option of becoming members or paying the equivalent of dues and fees;
the same options are open to them under a union shop.
In a union shop situation, an employee ineligible for membership as a result of
the union's dosed membership policies need not pay dues and fees. Assuming an
agency shop-closed union situation, if the union could deny membership to employees
on discriminatory grounds, while still insisting on support payments as condition of
employment, such a union would have a greater form of security than permissible
under the union shop since it could maintain its limited membership policies while
receiving payments from all employees, including those who lack the option of becoming members.
Since a possible denial of membership was not presented in the instant case, the
issue wa§ not decided. For a discussion of the problem see 71 YALE L.J. 330, 338-41
(1951).
ar Brief-for Appellee, pp. 11-13.
-With the exception of the first General Motors decision, the Board has always
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In conclusion, although the language of a union shop agreement
suggests that literal membership is required, it is not. The employee
unversed in the intricacies of labor law, however, would seldom
be aware of the options .available to him.29 Therefore, since an
agency shop is the form of union security which most clearly defines
the relation of the individual employee to the employer and the
union, it is the form most consistent with employees' rights as set
forth in section 7. Congress has decreed that all employees should
share in the costs of collective bargaining. The agency shop is clearly
in accord with this policy and should be legal under federal law.31
held that §8(a) (3) merely sets the maximum limits of permissible union security,
and that it thus encompasses and privileges any lesser form of security as well. See,
e.g., General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1951) (agency
shop agreement); American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952) (agency shop agree.
ment);, Public Service Co. of Colo., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950) (agency shop and maintenance-of-membership provisions).
-2 It is recognized that the employee does not have a wide discretion to exercise.
Member Leedom, in his dissent to the second Board decision, argues that the agency
shop coerces the employee to assume literal membership, by denying to the nonmember certain benefits afforded to members. "For who can say as a verity that a
man forced to buy a cake will not eat it." General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21,
48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1664 (1961). Employees with moral or religious objections to
unions, however, may find it a great solace to learn that they can avoid becoming
members by tendering dues and fees.
"0Section 7 provides that employees have the right to refrain from engaging In
union activities except as that right may be affected by a collective bargaining agree.
ment requiring membership in a union "as authorized in section 8 (a) (3)."
3 The justification for the agency shop is that the payments from nonmembers are
to be used to defray their share of collective bargaining expenses. There are, however,
union expenditures extending beyond the scope of representational activities. Moreover, there are benefits accorded to members to which the nonmembers making
identical support payments are not entitled, such as union pension funds and strike
relief. To make non-union employees pay for such expenditures would arguably be
to misapply the policy implicit in the union security proviso to the act, as well as to
.exert substantial coercion upon the employees to assume literal membership.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) dealt with the
problem of political expenditures by a union operating in a union shop situation.
The Court, avoiding the constitutional issue, construed provisions of the Railway Labor
Act which permit the union shop as denying the union authority to use an employee's
-dues, over his objections, for non-bargaining purposes.
This decision was relied on by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Allen v.
Southern Ry., 256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 147
(1962). Here nonmember employees were paying fees to a union expending funds for
political purposes. The employees were held entitled to enjoin the enforcement of
-the union shop agreement until the union could establish what portion of the funds
collected from nonmembers are used for purposes related to collective bargaining.
Conceivably, in the Allen case the Court will enlarge on the Street holding and
permit only an arrangement whereby payments covering their share of collective bargaining expenses are required of non-union members. Such a system would strictly
adhere to the congressional intent-that those receiving the benefits of collective bargaining should share in the costs.

